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Abstract Climate change is already producing ecological,
social, and economic impacts on fisheries, and these effects
are expected to increase in frequency and magnitude in the
future. Fisheries governance and regulations can alter
socio-ecological resilience to climate change impacts via
harvest control rules and incentives driving fisher behavior,
yet there are no syntheses or conceptual frameworks for
examining how institutions and their regulatory approaches
can alter fisheries resilience to climate change. We identify
nine key climate resilience criteria for fisheries socio-
ecological systems (SES), defining resilience as the ability
of the coupled system of interacting social and ecological
components (i.e., the SES) to absorb change while avoiding
transformation into a different undesirable state. We then
evaluate the capacity of four fisheries regulatory systems
that vary in their degree of property rights, including open
access, limited entry, and two types of rights-based
management, to increase or inhibit resilience. Our
exploratory assessment of evidence in the literature
suggests that these regulatory regimes vary widely in
their ability to promote resilient fisheries, with rights-based
approaches appearing to offer more resilience benefits in
many cases, but detailed characteristics of the regulatory
instruments are fundamental.
Keywords Climate change adaptation  Fisheries systems 
Resilience  Socio-ecological systems
INTRODUCTION
Marine systems have been and will continue to be impacted
by climate change across all habitats, latitudes, and trophic
levels (Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 2010; Richardson et al.
2012; Poloczanska et al. 2013; Rhein et al. 2013). These
impacts trickle up to the fisheries that humans depend upon
via alterations in primary productivity (Poloczanska et al.
2013), food webs (Edwards and Richardson 2004), and
community structure (Barange and Perry 2009). These
ecological shifts will produce both positive and negative
impacts (Cheung et al. 2012), but are expected to affect
fishers and fishing communities via altered fishing rev-
enues, increased costs per unit effort, higher insurance
costs, and/or changes in international fishing agreements,
among others (Adger et al. 2009; Badjeck et al. 2010;
Sumaila et al. 2011). Thus, there is a need for fisheries
management that promotes resilient social and ecological
systems in order to ensure long-term sustainability (Adger
et al. 2009; Grafton 2009).
While ecological resilience is traditionally defined as the
resistance of ecosystems or species to disturbance, and the
speed of recovery following disturbance (Holling 1973); in
social systems resilience is related to the disturbance,
reorganization, and renewal of communities and institu-
tions (Grafton 2009). Here we define socio-ecological
resilience as the ability of a SES to absorb disturbances
while retaining the same basic structure and ways of
functioning, the capacity for self-organization, and the
capacity to adapt to stress and change (IPCC 2007,
Davidson et al. 2013). Social–ecological resilience refers to
people and nature as inter-dependent systems (Folke et al.
2010), where changes in ecological resilience affect social
resilience and vice versa.
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We define a SES as a coupled and integrated system that
encompasses social and ecological components that interact
closely (Lo´pez-Angarita et al. 2014). Fisheries SES are
regulated in diverse ways including community manage-
ment, co-management, and strong top-down control rules
(e.g., limited licensing of vessels). Fisheries regulatory
regimes also vary in the extent of rights allocated to fishers
(e.g., access rights, property rights) and regulations stem-
ming from conservation measures that might be in place
(e.g., marine protected areas). These institutional and regu-
latory characteristics can have important implications for
how a fishery SES responds to climate change. For example,
protecting particular age classes by usingmore selective gear
(Cinner et al. 2009b; Grafton 2009) or protecting key habitat
by implementing no-take marine reserves (Allison et al.
2003; Gaines et al. 2010) can buffer stocks against climatic
shocks, helping fishers and communities to adapt. Similarly,
promoting long-term resource stewardship, for instance via
property rights, may provide incentives to fishers to apply
more precautionary or adaptive management approaches in
the face of looming climate change.
Many fisheries regulatory strategiesmay be ill prepared to
protect or enhance resilience to climate change (McClana-
han 2008). There is a growing body of research that addresses
the question of resilience to climate change from different
angles: by looking at climate change adaptation and resi-
lience in specific fisheries SES (Cinner et al. 2009a; Lopes
et al. 2011; Pinsky and Mantua 2014; Maldonado and Mor-
eno-Sa´nchez 2014) by assessing the adaptive capacity of
fisheries SES to confront climate change (Leith et al. 2014;
Lo´pez-Angarita et al. 2014; Rivera et al. 2014); and by
identifying attributes that safeguard economic (van Putten
et al. 2013) and ecological resilience for a given fishery
(McClanahan et al. 2012). However, no studies have sug-
gested broadly applicable criteria for assessing socio-eco-
logical resilience of fisheries. Moreover, the implications of
different regulatory systems for fisheries’ resilience to cli-
mate change is yet unknown (Smit et al. 2001; Folke 2006;
Pinsky and Mantua 2014).
This paper addresses this gap by conceptualizing resi-
lience in fisheries management systems by identifying nine
resilience criteria. We then explore four fisheries regulatory
systems (individual transferable quotas—ITQs; territorial
use rights for fisheries—TURFs; limited entry; and open
access) in terms of their capacity for social and ecological
resilience to climate change based on these criteria,
examining evidence in the literature. Our aim is to provide
a framework for understanding the effects of fisheries
regulatory regimes under a resilience perspective. Our
preliminary assessment of the resilience potential of these
regulatory approaches suggests important research direc-
tions to promote fisheries able to adapt to impending cli-
mate change.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
We derive three ecological criteria and six social criteria
for fisheries resilience from the literature, and conceptu-
alize the interactions among these criteria in terms of
achieving overall resilience for fisheries SES. We follow a
step-wise process where we (1) identify the main criteria
from the scientific literature that have been proposed and/or
observed to contribute to ecological and social resilience in
fisheries systems; (2) discuss the potential of the selected
fisheries regulatory regimes to achieve the resilience cri-
teria; and (3) illustrate with available examples evidence of
the regulatory regimes supporting or compromising each
resilience criterion.
We focus the analysis on four classes of fisheries reg-
ulatory systems (TURFS, ITQs, limited entry, and open
access) in terms of their potential to promote or inhibit
resilience to climate change. We select these management
systems based on different levels of access privileges for
individuals and/or groups (Hilborn et al. 2005). Here open
access represents the least exclusive regime in which
anyone who wishes can participate. Under limited entry,
licenses allow for the right to participate in fishing the
resource contingent on compliance with regulations such as
gear and/or effort limitations. In ITQs, quota ownership is
required to fish a proportion of the total catch or effort, and
finally, in TURFS, rights are granted to fish specific fishing
grounds, an approach that is somewhat more common in
artisanal and small-scale fisheries (Hilborn et al. 2005). We
focus on these regulatory regimes because there has been a
lot of interest in the literature on the benefits of more
exclusive access for fisheries (see Costello et al. 2008 for
example), but our framework could also be applied to other
types of fisheries governance and management. See the
Supplementary Materials (Methods section) for a more
detailed description of the steps and methods followed.
CLIMATE RESILIENCE CRITERIA
From a detailed review of the literature, we identify three
ecological climate resilience (ECR) and six socio-eco-
nomic climate resilience (SCR) criteria for assessing the
resilience potential of fisheries management systems. We
summarize these criteria in Table 1, where we include the
rationale supporting each criterion and references that
support the link between resilience and the specific crite-
rion. A more detailed description of the different criteria
and supporting literature is available in Supplementary
Materials.
Although we classify resilience criteria as either social
or ecological, feedbacks and interactions exist whereby
ecological criteria can enhance or erode social resilience,
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and vice versa, creating complex tradeoffs and synergies
within fisheries’ resilience options. Based on arguments
made in the literature, the nature of these social–ecological
resilience interactions for the nine criteria is represented in
Fig. 1.
Ecological criteria like Sustainable and age-diverse
populations (ECR-1) and Conservation of biodiversity and
habitats (ECR-2) have clear ecological benefits for resi-
lience (Levin and Lubchenco 2008; Perry et al. 2010;
Bernhardt and Leslie 2013), which can also enhance social
resilience as fishers may have a more secure source of
income when fish populations are sustainably managed
(ECR-1). These social benefits can also arise in the longer
run as habitats and ecosystems are in a good state (ECR-2).
Managing existing stressors (ECR-3) is expected to
increase ecological resilience (Barange and Perry 2009),
but can have varying effects for social resilience. For
example, decreasing stressors like pollution may increase
revenues due to an increase in quality/quantity of fish, but
can also compromise livelihood diversification through
more restrictive regulations placed on other sectors (i.e.,
agriculture, Badjeck et al. 2010).
Social criteria, specifically adaptive management
(SCR-1) is likely to increase ecological resilience by
incorporating learning and new science into management
(Plaganyi et al. 2011; Rivera et al. 2014), which can
increase the likelihood that fishing pressure is sustainable
and prepare fishers for abrupt and unexpected changes
(Lehodey et al. 2006). Diversified livelihoods (SCR-2)
may promote social resilience by decreasing reliance on
fisheries (Cinner et al. 2009a; Defeo et al. 2014; Pinsky
and Mantua 2014), but the impacts on ecological resi-
lience remain unclear as fishers may engage in other
activities that are damaging for the ecosystem, and/or
lack stewardship incentives if they can easily exit the
sector. Stewardship incentives (SCR-3) can increase
ecological resilience as fishers may advocate for sus-
tainable management. Stewardship is promoted under
long-lasting access to the resource, which also contributes
to social resilience (Essington et al. 2012). Multi-level
governance (SCR-4) increases social resilience by pro-
viding flexibility in resource management, for example by
matching management scales to biological scales of the
resources. Multi-level governance can also facilitate the
implementation of adaptive management that increases
ecological resilience (Hughes et al. 2005). The Maine
lobster fishery provides a good example of multi-level
governance that led to careful monitoring, adaptive
management, and sustainable harvest of the resource
(Schultz et al. 2015).
Table 1 Fisheries socio-ecological climate resilience criteria
Climate resilience
criteria
Rationale Literature sources
ECR-1: sustainable &
age-diverse target
populations
Increased population abundance, age structure, and genetic
diversity buffer against stock collapse from environmental
shocks
Brander (2009), Perry et al. (2010), and
Hsieh et al. (2006)
ECR-2: conserving
biodiversity &
habitats
Conserving biodiversity, community structure, and habitats
support fish population resistance and recovery to external
stressors
Levin and Lubchenco (2008) and Worm
et al. (2006)
ECR-3: managing
existing stressors
Non-climatic stressors (e.g., pollution, habitat destruction)
render fisheries systems less resilient to climate impacts
Crain et al. (2008), Feely et al. (2010),
and Cai et al. (2011)
SCR-1: adaptive
management
Institutional capacity to experiment and learn are necessary to
cope with uncertain and unforeseen climate impacts on
fisheries
de Moor et al. (2008), Plaganyi et al.
(2011), Davidson et al. (2013), and
Rivera et al. (2014)
SCR-2: diversified
livelihoods
Alternative sources of income for fishers increase social
resilience in the face of economic instability from climate
impacts on fisheries
Allison and Ellis 2001, Sumaila et al.
(2011), Grafton (2009), and Badjeck
et al. (2010)
SCR-3: promoting long-
term stewardship
Promoting long-term stewardship provides incentives to
manage the resources sustainably in the face of future
climate impacts
Essington et al. (2012), Cancino et al.
(2007), Jardine and Sanchirico
(2012), and Nowlis and van Benthem
(2012)
SCR-4: multi-level
governance
Governance over a fishery at different scales creates a flexible
structure for adapting to change at multiple scales
Grafton (2009), Hughes et al. (2005),
and Fidelman et al. (2013)
SCR-5: Fisher mobility Technology and capacity to change fishing locations increase
social resilience under shifting stocks
Sumaila et al. (2011), Grafton (2009),
and Pinsky and Mantua, (2014)
SCR-6: community-
based management
Community-based management can improve economic
conditions for fishers and mitigate environmental impacts
Tompkins and Eakin (2012), Adger
(2003), Ovando et al. (2013), and
Defeo et al. (2014)
ECR ecological resilience criteria, SCR socio-economic resilience criteria
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Fisher mobility (SCR-5) can increase social resilience,
especially for industrial fisheries (Pinsky and Mantua 2014)
that have the capacity to change fishing grounds easily
(Allison and Ellis 2001). For small-scale fisheries, mobility
can be also be beneficial for accessing new areas that
become more productive due to shifting stocks. In both
cases, fisher mobility may decrease ecological resilience as
fishers can deplete one area and move to the next, but may
increase social resilience as fishers access new fishing
grounds. This potential positive effect of mobility for social
resilience could be limited, however, by negative interac-
tions among ‘original’ and ‘new’ fishers in a given area.
Finally, Community-based management (SCR-6) is
expected to increase social resilience by enhancing the
sense of stewardship and sensitivity of fishers to socio-
economic constraints, and by allowing for the incorpora-
tion of local knowledge of the resource (Gutierrez et al.
2011). Community-based management is also a potentially
useful approach to generate adaptive capacity (Rivera et al.
2015). Adaptive capacity refers to the ability to anticipate
and respond to disturbances, and to minimize, cope with,
and recover from their consequences (Maldonado and
Moreno-Sa´nchez 2014). Community-based management
has also been shown to improve compliance with rules
(e.g., catch limits, size limits), monitoring, and surveillance
(Gutierrez et al. 2011) that will directly benefit ecological
resilience.
CLIMATE RESILIENCE OF FISHERIES
REGULATORY REGIMES
Fisheries regulatory systems vary in their approaches to
harvest control rules, fisher behavioral incentives, and
adaptability to a changing environment. We examine
specific regulatory approaches ranging from open access to
limited entry to rights-based systems (ITQs and TURFs),
and discuss their likelihood of meeting the above resilience
criteria. To illustrate the potential effects of regulatory
regimes on fisheries resilience, we collect a number of
Fig. 1 Tradeoffs and synergies in socio-ecological resilience criteria for fisheries. ECR ecological criteria, SCR social criteria
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examples from the literature that we describe here and
summarize in Table 2.
Open access
Open access fisheries do not have well-defined access
rights; access rights either are completely absent or are not
enforced (Sumaila 2012). Under open access, the fish stock
is rival but non-excludable, meaning that the right to fish is
accorded to anyone, sometimes with a license or a nominal
fee accessible to anyone. Individuals have incentives to
maximize their profits, even at the expense of capturing as
many fish as possible in a short time (Hardin 1968; Cost-
anza et al. 1998), which can lead to unsustainable harvest
levels and destructive fishing practices that will eventually
erode the economic value of the fishery as well (Worm
et al. 2009). Additionally, unlimited access can create a
competitive ‘race to fish’ to catch fish before others do,
which further exacerbates overfishing and incentivizes
over-capitalization, redundant effort, and inefficient timing
of harvest, again lowering the profitability of the fishery
(Pauly et al. 2002; Costello et al. 2008, 2010). Many
fisheries around the world are managed as open access;
however, open access systems have a poor record of per-
formance in terms of sustainability (Gordon 1954; Costello
et al. 2010) and are a primary contributor to the stock
collapse of many of the world’s fisheries (Pauly et al.
2002). In addition, for overexploited fisheries, reducing
fishing pressure is the principal means of reducing the
impacts of climate change (Brander 2007), and this may be
difficult to achieve under open access regimes.
In open access fisheries, harvest decisions are often
made with limited consideration of ecological information
or economic costs and benefits to society (Costanza et al.
1998), and there is often low compliance with regulations
due to the lack of well-defined access rights and enforce-
ment (Sumaila 2012). An open access system lacks allo-
cation of property rights, which have been demonstrated to
create incentives for conserving biodiversity and habitats.
Thus, in the absence of rights, open access does not pro-
mote the conservation of habitats and ecosystems (ECR-2),
nor sustainable management (ERC-1), and intensive and
sometimes destructive fishing prevails over sustainable use
of the resource (Grafton et al. 2006). Well-known fisheries
collapses have occurred in open access systems, like the
Canadian Atlantic cod (McCay et al. 2011), in part because
adaptive management (SCR-1) is discouraged by the reg-
ulatory regime.
Large open access systems may also experience com-
plex stakeholder and institutional networks (Fidelman et al.
2013). For example in the Peruvian anchoveta, formal
institutions are slow in responding to climate changes
(Badjeck et al. 2009), constraining effective multi-level
governance (SCR-4), and making community-based man-
agement (SCR-6) more difficult (Badjeck et al. 2009). In
fact, management involvement of stakeholders who do not
have a long-term interest in the fishery may even have
negative effects on sustainability (Botsford et al. 1997), as
they may lack stewardship incentives (SCR-3) (Costello
et al. 2008). In theory for open access, fishers respond to
profitability, entering a fishery depending on the expected
economic returns at a given time. In this context, fishers
enter and exit the fishery more freely, which may help them
buffer against stock fluctuations or declining stocks by
having developed alternative sources of income (livelihood
diversification (SCR-2)) (Allison and Ellis 2001). How-
ever, this flexibility may be limited by the high capital
investments in many open access systems that make it
more difficult to exit the fishery, and for the poorest fishers,
who may remain in the fishery despite severely declining
stocks (e.g., Cinner et al. 2009a). Fisher mobility can be
high in open access systems, and fishers may be accus-
tomed to shifting from one area to another in the search for
productive stocks (SCR-5) (Sumaila et al. 2011). On the
ecological side, however, fisher mobility is related to a
decrease in ecological resilience due to the serial depletion
of stocks and to a lower capacity to monitor and determine
population dynamics, making adaptive management more
difficult (SCR-1) (DeYoung et al. 2008; Leith et al. 2014).
Limited entry
Limited entry, also known as restricted access, occurs
when a management institution establishes conditions (e.g.,
licenses, gear limitations, area/seasonal restrictions) that
determine and limit who is able to fish (Townsend 1990).
Most commonly in limited access, there are a fixed number
of licenses issued that permit access to harvest the
resource, as is the case for many commercial fisheries
around the world (Hilborn et al. 2005).
Despite the different possible restrictions on access,
fisheries can underperform or fail in economic and bio-
logical terms due to excessive capital investment (Hilborn
et al. 2005), redundant effort, inefficient timing of harvest,
or other inefficiencies that are also common to the open
access regime (Costello et al. 2010). Indeed, failure to
control effort can still lead a limited entry fishery to near
open access overcapacity and effort conditions, with the
subsequent negative implications for recovery under cli-
mate change (Brander 2007). This overcapacity provides
no incentives to fishers to engage in sustainable manage-
ment (Hilborn et al. 2005; Defeo et al. 2014).
Some limited entry fisheries have resulted in sustainable
harvest (ECR-1) (Townsend 1990, Hilborn et al. 2003),
generally when institutional systems provide incentives to
individual operators to motivate sustainable harvest
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(Hilborn et al. 2005). However, solely restricting access in
order to manage fisheries does not guarantee sustainable
harvest or conservation of biodiversity or habitat (ECR-2)
(Hilborn et al. 2005). Limited entry per se does not
incentivize fishers to respond to fishery stressors (ERC-3)
and avoid discards, for example, as evidenced in the US
west coast trawling fishery that discarded 40 percent of
catches (Hilborn et al. 2005). Successful examples exist,
however, under mandatory controls to avoid by-catch, such
as the East Australian longline fishery that uses limited
entry spatial zones to conserve Bluefin tuna (Hobday et al.
2010). In regard to social resilience, limited entry as a
management system usually fails to address stewardship
(SCR-3) due to the low level of access rights, but may be
flexible for engaging in alternative livelihoods (SCR-2) for
the same reason (Allison and Ellis 2001). The top-down
nature of restricting access frequently hinders community-
based management (SCR-6), and in some cases also pro-
duces a mismatch between management and biological
scales, as in the example of the Atlantic tuna fishery
(Berkes 2006). A detailed analysis of effective multi-level
governance (SCR-4) has been conducted in the Australian
Great Barrier Reef fisheries (Fidelman et al. 2013). In this
region, the potential of a multi-level approach to help the
system adapt to climate change appears to be threatened by
a complex and fragmented governance system (Fidelman
et al. 2013).
Unlike open access, limited entry systems could be
implemented more effectively from a community-based
basis (SCR-6), as shown by hake and pollock cooperatives
in the United States (Hilborn et al. 2005). However, com-
munity-based management within a limited entry setting
may not be sufficient for achieving sustainable use of the
resource, as in the case of the Galapagos sea cucumber
fishery (Defeo et al. 2014), where the fishery was incapable
of implementing adaptive management (SCR-1). In con-
trast, limited access regulations can be relatively easily
adjusted—including changing the number or cost of
licenses, or altering area and gear restrictions based on
seasonal projections (Wilen 1988; Townsend 1990). This
flexibility can potentially be beneficial for adaptive man-
agement (SCR-1), and for allowing fishing in new areas
(SCR-5) when stocks shift their distributions (Cheung et al.
2012).
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs)
Catch share systems such as individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) allocate to owners the right to harvest a specified
proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC), where rights
are divisible, leasable, and transferable among users
(Costello et al. 2010). Fish stocks are usually managed at a
regional level where the responsible institution sets the
TAC with which users must comply. ITQs are typically
non-spatial, in the sense that stocks are often mobile and
participants can harvest these stocks anywhere as long as
they operate within agreed upon jurisdictional limits. This
flexibility can help in adapting to climate change shifting
stocks, but past examples have shown how unanticipated
environmental regime shifts, such as those expected from
climate change, pose serious challenges for maintaining
international cooperation for transboundary stocks under
ITQs, as for example the Pacific salmon conflict between
the US and Canada (Miller and Munro 2004).
ITQs vary in design (e.g., tenure length, rules regarding
transferability), which may impact resilience. For example,
ITQs have been observed to decrease variability in land-
ings and exploitation rates for multi-species fisheries, but
this effect is only present when the ITQ right is durable and
secure (Essington et al. 2012), namely when rights have an
appropriately long tenure. In fact, secure rights have also
been shown to provide higher asset values from the fishery
(Grainger and Costello 2011). It is widely recognized that
ITQ fisheries are less likely to experience a collapse in
landings or to have excessive overfishing, and they typi-
cally lead to better compliance with catch limits compared
to the absence of rights (Townsend 1990; Worm et al.
2006; Costello et al. 2008, 2010; Essington et al. 2012;
Melnychuk et al. 2012; van Putten et al. 2013). Well-de-
signed ITQs can lead fishers to support lower TACs
(Costello et al. 2010), and to avoid short-term resource
degradation (Essington et al. 2012). Long-term rights can
also in some cases promote the conservation of non-target
species or habitats (ECR-2). One example is fishers vol-
untarily retiring bottom longlines known to damage corals
(Arnason 2002). However, when ITQs are allocated only to
target species, there may be little incentive to avoid by-
catch of non-target species, and therefore multi-species
ITQs have been created to diminish by-catch discards
(Costello et al. 2010).
Access rights better align users’ economic incentives
with ecological goals (Essington et al. 2012). In an ITQ
fishery, quota owners have incentives to maintain the tar-
geted resource at a sustainable limit (ECR-1), and in some
cases there is evidence of stock recovery (Hentrich and
Salomon 2006). Chu (2009) reviewed 20 ITQ fisheries
around the world finding that 12 stocks were improved
after ITQ implementation, but they conclude that addi-
tional measures are still necessary to promote recovery,
such as good enforcement and monitoring, or implement-
ing ecosystem-based fisheries management (Chu 2009).
ITQs can promote stewardship that enhances social resi-
lience by instilling a longer-term perspective in resource
management (SCR-3) and promoting decisions that maxi-
mize long-term profitability (Essington et al. 2012). For
example, voluntary surveillance and monitoring
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institutions have been established under New Zealand ITQ
fisheries (ECR-3) (Hentrich and Salomon 2006).
Multi-level governance can be possible, although ITQ
systems are usually designed as top-down management
institutions (SCR-4). An exception is the Netherlands ITQ
system that is based on local management groups, and
emerged from a co-management system between regional
producer organizations (Hentrich and Salomon 2006).
ITQs may not facilitate diversified livelihoods (SCR-2), for
example fishers exiting New Zealand’s ITQ systems were
found to lack any alternative livelihood option (citation).
Fishing fleet mobility, given that rights are over a stock
rather than over a territory, contributes to social resilience
by allowing vessel operators to access fish stocks that vary
in or shift their distribution so long as they do not shift
outside of the jurisdiction of the ITQ system (SCR-5).
Higher mobility is most likely in technology-intensive
commercial fisheries, where larger operators may be able to
change their operation in response to fish redistributions
(Fulton 2011; Holbrook and Johnson 2014). However,
there will be important constraints to this flexibility, related
to competition for new areas and restrictions imposed by
international borders (Cheung et al. 2012), as well as
governance problems due to the changes in species’ dis-
tributions across national borders and the resulting impli-
cations for management institutions (Berkes 2006). Miller
and Munro (2004) propose side payments between two
countries as a way to increase ITQ flexibility under climate
change when countries face an environmental regime shift
and the access to the resource varies in time. Finally, and
despite the fact that little progress has been made in
incorporating community-based management into ITQ
systems (Arnason 2005), the two approaches can be com-
patible (SCR-6), as observed for the case of the Tasmanian
lobster fishery. There the success was due to a combination
of ITQs with a strong tradition of participatory manage-
ment (van Putten et al. 2013).
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) define property
rights over spatial areas of the ocean, as opposed to rights
over a portion of the catch (Costello et al. 2010). TURFs
are fixed in space and provide concessions to individual
fishers or unions/cooperatives to manage the resources.
Monitoring and enforcement typically depends on the
owners, while fisheries agencies are commonly responsible
for establishing the overall total allowable catch (TAC).
TURFs constitute a common near-shore fisheries manage-
ment system in many countries such as Chile, Spain, Japan,
and Mexico (Wilen et al. 2012).
TURF fisheries that are managed through incentive-
based participation and effective enforcement may be
better able to withstand climate impacts (Hilborn et al.
2003), and thus be more durable against environmental
change. For example in Chile, TURFs resulted in increased
abundance and size of managed and unmanaged species in
comparison with open access areas (Gelcich et al. 2012;
ECR-1). A survey of species and habitats inside and out-
side of several TURFs in Chile showed that reef fish spe-
cies had significantly higher species richness, biomass, and
density in TURFs compared with open access areas (ECR-
2), even though these are not the managed species under
property rights regimes (Gelcich et al. 2012). In Galicia,
Spain the TURF system includes advisors working with
fisher cooperatives, who facilitate and support decision-
making processes and play a key role in communication
between fishers, scientists, and policy makers (Macho et al.
2013). These strategies can in many cases allow for
adaptive (SCR-1) and community-based management
(SCR-6) (Hilborn et al. 2005; Defeo et al. 2014). Having
spatial property rights may also create incentives for
avoiding other anthropogenic pressures that lead to habitat
destruction (ECR-3). In TURFs, fishers tend to more
actively monitor their territories (Gelcich et al. 2008),
protecting against sources of habitat destruction and pol-
lution. Additionally, spatial property rights provide incen-
tives for fishers to combat poaching, even giving fishers
direct authority over surveillance. For example, in the
Spanish Asturias TURF system for goose barnacle, mem-
bers actively engage in surveillance to prevent illegal
harvest (Rivera et al. 2014).
Since TURFs give exclusive control over the target
species in a given area, they create incentives for broader
ecosystem-wide stewardship (Costello et al. 2010), thus
reducing fishing mortality and contributing to the ecolog-
ical resilience of the fish populations (ECR-1) (Defeo et al.
2014). Additionally, social resilience is increased by
maintaining the stock at desirable levels for a longer-term
provision of services (SCR-3) (Defeo et al. 2014). Own-
ership of an area can also allow TURF owners to generate
revenues through other compatible activities such as tour-
ism, recreation, and aquaculture—thus diversifying local
livelihoods and enhancing social resilience (SCR-2). For
example, research has shown that TURFs in Chile have led
to a high level of diversified income sources for the fishers
involved (Moreno and Revenga 2012).
The governance of TURFS can include some top-down
control but is generally community-based, which allows
both for a participative bottom-up and multi-level gover-
nance structure involving the local cooperatives and/or
unions of fishers and local and regional institutions in the
governance process (SRC-4) (Ovando et al. 2013). The
Asturias goose barnacle TURF system has promoted the
incorporation of traditional knowledge into management
and the matching of resource and management scales
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(Rivera et al. 2014). On-site decision-making also helps in
designing management plans and rules that avoid perverse
incentives such as the ‘race to fish’ or subsidizing over-
capacity fleets and related industries (Pauly et al. 2002).
For example in Japan, the institutional flexibility of the
TURF system allowed for the bottom-up creation of new
management associations for particular species when nec-
essary (Wilen et al. 2012). Regarding fisher mobility,
TURFs inhibit movement because access rights are to
specific fishing grounds (e.g., Aburto et al. 2013). Their
spatial nature causes TURFs to be potentially worse than
ITQs, limited entry, or open access in terms of promoting
fisher mobility, which could be quite problematic for
resilience when fish stocks exhibit major shifts in distri-
bution (SCR-5).
DISCUSSION
We propose a new framework for studying and addressing
the question of resilience to climate change under different
fishery regulatory regimes. We derive nine climate resi-
lience criteria for fisheries, and use them to understand the
potential socio-ecological benefits and deficiencies of four
common fisheries systems. Our literature review does not
provide a systematic comparison of how different systems
perform in terms of resilience, although the criteria pre-
sented here could be applied in a quantitative comparison.
Previous analyses have conducted systematic comparisons
for specific dimensions of resilience (Leith et al. 2014;
Lo´pez-Angarita et al. 2014; Rivera et al. 2014), but our
approach could facilitate more encompassing assessments
of socio-ecological resilience. Additionally, we provide a
framework for future research and suggest new questions
based on the likely resilience effects, tradeoffs, and syn-
ergies revealed from our review of the existing literature
(Table 2). The variation in resilience factors for different
fisheries regulatory regimes is likely substantial. Design
attributes of the regulatory regime (i.e., bottom-up vs. top-
down management approaches; by-catch avoidance or
mitigation measures; monitoring and enforcement) as well
as the scale of the system may also play important roles in
determining resilience to climate change. Nevertheless, we
did find some general patterns in terms of resilience
potential of the regulatory regimes examined here.
Open access appears to offer potential benefits in only
one criterion, fisher mobility, although the consequence of
fisher mobility can be counteractive, as explained before.
There is little open access fishers can do in response to
climate change beyond altering the quantity or location of
effort following shifts in species distributions. Failure to
build socio-economic resilience can result in important
consequences, as climate change impacts act on the already
overfished stocks that typify open access regimes. Fur-
thermore, issues of migration, food security, and poverty
that compromise resilience are also more likely to arise in
open access settings (Allison and Ellis 2001).
Limited entry fisheries likely offer only modest gains in
resilience compared to open access management—limited
entry management can result in sustainable harvest, and the
rules governing limited entry can be adapted to respond to
changing conditions (i.e., adjusting seasonal closures to
coincide with altered spawning times). But these benefits
depend on the success of management institutions in
achieving effective harvest controls, and restricting access
alone often has limited benefits to stock status (Hilborn
et al. 2003) while also failing to establish conditions for
other socio-economic resilience factors.
ITQs have the advantage of providing stewardship
incentives to quota owners, potentially resulting in more
sustainable harvest (Costello et al. 2008; Grainger and
Costello 2011). However, the social resilience of the fish-
ery can be compromised as the implementation of the
system of rights to owners may force excluded fishers to
exit the fishery (Arnason 2005). Livelihood diversification
options may be more limited to these former fishers who
have lost access to the resource, as they have lost a source
of income. On the other hand, the ability of quota holders
to retain rights to access shifting stocks enhances resilience
via their choice between pursuing target species in their
new distribution or selling their permits to others willing to
do so. However, shifts in species distribution may move
beyond the current jurisdictional borders of the ITQ sys-
tem, which together with high prices for transferability may
pose important challenges in the future.
Spatial rights-based approaches such as TURFs appear
to provide a better foundation for building resilience in
fisheries by encouraging stewardship in fishers, as well as
ecosystem-based management and conservation. As seen in
Chilean and Japanese TURF systems, community and
nested governance structures evolved due to the local
nature of allocated fishing areas—producing a system that
may be better able to respond to climate impacts. On the
other hand, climate impacts and spatial rights could be
highly spatially correlated, with negative climate impacts
across a system of TURFs posing serious difficulties to the
system’s resilience. In such a case, low mobility for fishers
may decrease social resilience and alternative management
scales and/or cooperation agreements may be fundamental.
However, although spatial rights may seem vulnerable to
climate-induced species shifts, this perspective ignores the
potential socio-ecological resilience benefits that TURFs
may offer to vulnerable species that are pushed into TURFs
at the leading edge of their shifting range as opposed to into
open access areas. Conversely, there are no studies of the
potential incentives for overharvesting species at the
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trailing edge of a distribution shift, given that TURF
owners may not be willing to steward a resource that they
are losing due to climate change (Pinsky and Mantua
2014).
TURF owners and quota holders with a direct longer-
term interest in the persistence of a fishery may be more
willing to implement climate change mitigation and
adaptation strategies, such as connected TURF networks or
multi-species ITQs, to maintain their investment rather
than simply exploiting the remaining population to maxi-
mize short-term gain.
Our analysis suggests a variety of future research
directions on climate resiliency and fisheries. For one, there
are likely other contributing factors to socio-ecological
resilience in fisheries that have yet to be identified or well
studied. For example, recent research shows the effect of
strong leadership contributing to the success of fishery
management (Gutierrez et al. 2011), a factor that may also
contribute to climate change resilience. Additionally, high
social vulnerability due to poverty and other factors,
together with compromised human rights for fishers in
some areas, may be related to resilience as well, where
more secure and less vulnerable fishers have more incen-
tives to sustainably manage their resource (Allison et al.
2012).
Second, the interactions between social and ecological
factors that determine resilience are still poorly understood.
We attempt to map these tradeoffs and feedbacks, but
additional studies and analysis are needed. Quantifying
these interactions can illuminate interesting tensions in the
criteria—for example, alternative livelihoods can offer
income during periods when environmental conditions
have resulted in low yields; however, other economic
opportunities may also undermine incentives to steward the
resource and maintain fishing as an economic opportunity.
Furthermore, it is possible that combining different man-
agement or regulatory systems may produce significant
socio-ecological climate resilience synergies (e.g., San-
chirico and Wilen 2002; Costello and Kaffine 2010). One
example could be coupling TURFs with marine reserves
(Afflerbach et al. 2014; Lester et al. 2016).
Third, it is important to note that while we do not dis-
tinguish among our criteria in terms of value or impor-
tance, certain socio-ecological climate resilience factors
are likely more critical than others and their relative
importance could be context specific. We found that the
amount of evidence in the literature supporting each cri-
teria varies greatly; for example, there is a wealth of
information regarding the effect of sustainable harvest
levels on fish population stability, but much less investi-
gation on the effect of fisher mobility in providing resi-
lience to climate impacts (Pinsky and Mantua 2014).
Lastly, there is a need for more empirical research on
resilience in fisheries SES. Establishing clear and replica-
ble metrics and monitoring fisheries SES responses to cli-
mate impacts are key needs to quantify the relative benefits
of our derived socio-ecological resilience criteria and the
overall impact of managing fisheries for resilience. Future
research can apply this framework to a given fishery in
order to understand how the different resilience factors
interact and vary in importance in a context-dependent
manner. Similarly, comparing quantitative assessments for
fisheries with different management regimes will allow for
a better understanding of how management institutions
facilitate or hinder resilience under climate change.
CONCLUSION
The climate change impacts already affecting the world’s
oceans provide a compelling need to understand whether
current fisheries management systems are resilient and how
they are likely to fare under future conditions. While
complex, a socio-ecological resilience approach to fisheries
management can offer prescriptive approaches to buffer
and enhance recovery from climate change impacts.
Rights-based fisheries regimes (e.g., TURFs, ITQs) are
likely to outperform open access in terms of many potential
resilience benefits, all systems exhibit variation in socio-
ecological resilience, and design details of the regulatory
and management instruments are fundamental.
Our framework offers a first approach to evaluating
impact of regulatory systems on fisheries resilience to cli-
mate change. This framework highlights the multiple
dimensions of resilience in a fishery and the complexity in
designing a regulatory regime that contributes to resilience.
Further research is needed to identify the design features
that makes each of the regimes more resilient to climate
change (i.e., multi-level governance vs. top-down control
rules, community-based management vs. centralized man-
agement, geographic scale of management, specific man-
agement regulations) and the importance of socio-
ecological contextual variables of the system (e.g., bio-
logical attributes of the target species, fishing technology).
As steadily rising greenhouse gas emissions continue to
produce climate change impacts, fisheries management will
need to address these complex dynamics to build resilient
systems for the future.
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